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of proximate cause as in any other action grounded on negligence. Fisher v.
Western Union Telegraph Company, 119 Wis. 146, 96 N.W. 545 (1903). The
chain of causation between the conduct of the defendant's servant in denying the
plaintiff the use of the company's facilities and the loss which the plaintiff
sustained by the fire is indirect. Whether the conduct of the defendant's servant
is to be considered a dominant factor as contributing to the plaintiff's loss or
whether it has been too remote, is a question for the judge to decide before he
permits the jury to consider the case. The courts in these cases have considered
various factors in determining the chain of causation. In cases where the courts
have held against the plaintiff under similar facts, they have emphasized such
conditions as: the time it would take before the property was destroyed [how
is this to be determined?], ability of the fire department to respond immediately,
condition of the apparatus and the sufficiency of the water supply. Volquardsen
v. Io'wa Telephone Company, 148 Iowa 77, 126 N.W. 928 (1910) ; Providence
Washington Insurance Company v. Iowa Telephone Company, 172 Iowa 597, 154
N.W. 874 (1915). In the latter case the court considered the type of fire and the
condition of the barn in which the burning car was kept as matters of importance. The time of the year, the material of the building, its contents and the
force of the wind have also been emphasized by some of the courts. Lebanon,
Louisville and Lexington Telephone Company v. Lanham Lumber Company, 131
Ky. 718, 115 S.W. 824 (1909). The fact that an alarm bell at the fire station
was not in working condition, that the water pressure was too weak and the
hose defective were thought by the court to be matters of importance in Southwestern Telegraph and Telephone Company v. Thonas, (Tex. Civ. App. 1916)
185 S.W. 396. In the instant case, the court took into consideration the testimony of the members of the fire department as to how long it would have
taken them to get to the fire (other courts have held such testimony to be too
conjectural), the fact that the equipment was in good condition, and though it
was shown that the wind was against the fire, the court nevertheless felt that
the jury might well find that these were dominant factors in establishing the
defendant's negligence as the "proximate cause" of the loss.
ELIZABETH C. LEIS.

WILLS-CONTRACTS AMONG DESCENDANTS-JURISDICTION

OF COUNTY COURT.-

The plaintiff, one of four sons and three daughters, heirs of the intestate's
estate, signed a contract whereby he and his three sisters were to divide the
personal property equally, and the other three brothers were to divide the real
estate equally. A check for $8,917.86 was deposited in a bank for plaintiff's use,
but he refused to accept it, because he had changed his mind. He wanted the
contract altered so that he could get some of the land instead of money. The
plaintiff applied for citation to issue requiring the administrators to render a
full and final account. The court approved the distribution in compliance with
the contract and ordered the release of the administrators and their bond.
On appeal, held, order affirmed; a probate court has jurisdiction to distribute
the assets of the estate in accordance with a contract made by the heirs. In re
Richardson's Estate, (Wis. 1937) 271 N.W. 56.
The decision of the court was based on its interpretation of the Wisconsin
statutes extending the jurisdiction of the probate court "to all matters relating
to the settlement of the estates" of deceased persons. Wis. STAT. (1935) §§ 253.03,
318.06 (1, 2). It was deduced from these sections that the jurisdiction of the
county courts was broad enough to include all interests of all persons, heirs or
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their assignees in the administration of an intestate's estate. The court relied
strongly on State ex rel. Peterson v. Circuit Court, 177 Wis. 548, 188 N.W. 645
(1922). In that case the probate court assumed jurisdiction of a petition asking
for distribution of an estate in accordance with an ante-nuptial contract. In
another case cited, Wisdom v. Wisdom, 155 Wis. 434, 145 N.W. 126 (1913), the
widow's property had been fraudulently appropriated by her deceased husband
who then willed it to his son by a previous marriage. In these two cases the
court enforced contracts which were entered into by the deceased. Neither of
them involved a contract by the heirs of an intestate estate. It is suggested
that there is an important difference between the enforcement of a contract
entered into by the deceased and one agreed upon by the heirs. Such a contract
disposing of the estate contrary to the provisions of a will would be void in
Wisconsin. In re Estate of Sipchen, 180 Wis. 504, 193 N.W. 385 (1923);
In re Stanley's Will, (Wis. 1936) 269 N.W. 550. The former case involved an
agreement by the legatees to distribute the estate with regard to advancements
made by the testator, although no mention of the advancements was made in
the will. The latter presented an arrangement betveen the trustee and beneficiary providing a fixed income for the beneficiary instead of following the
exact provisions of the will. In both instances the supreme court held that the
probate court must enforce the validly expressed intent of the testator and it
was without jurisdiction to make distribution in accordance with a contract
contrary to the terms of the will. Although the parties interested have the
right to contract in reference to their shares, they must have the contract
enforced in the proper court. This doctrine in force in Wisconsin is an exception to the prevailing theory. In Wisconsin public policy supports the will. In
some jurisdictions public policy supports the contract entered into by the heirs.
In re Noble, 141 Kan. 432, 41 P. (2d) 1021 (1935); and see Note (1935) 97
A.L.R. 468. It is true also that the majority view favors family compromises for
the settlement of intestate estates and enforces them by the courts. See Note
(1920) 6 A.L.R. 555; Note (1925) 38 A.L.R. 759; Note (1928) 54 A.L.R. 976.
It was recognized in the principal case that the three brothers would have to
resort to a court of equity to quiet their title to the property. The final decree
of the court of equity "did not of itself transfer the title to property, but merely
determined the persons entitled thereto, and their respective interests therein."
The logical expectation would be that all such contracts would be treated alike
and settled by one court or the other. But now the Wisconsin court has cut the
Jurisdiction of such contracts into two sections, those under a will, and those
under an intestate estate, and they must be enforced in different courts.
JOSEPH E. DEAN.

